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REFORMING THE FILIBUSTER 
Gerard N. Magliocca* 
Filibusters are a necessary evil, which must be tolerated lest the Senate lose its 
special strength and become a mere appendage of the House of Representa-
tives.† 
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INTRODUCTION 
The most troubling countermajoritarian difficulty in modern constitu-
tional law is Rule XXII of the United States Senate.1  Forty-one senators, 
 
*  Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law–Indianapolis.  Many thanks to Carlo Andre-
ani, Aaron Bruhl, Josh Chafetz, Dan Cole, and Mike Pitts for their excellent comments.  
†  GREGORY J. WAWRO & ERIC SCHICKLER, FILIBUSTER: OBSTRUCTION AND LAWMAKING IN THE 
U.S. SENATE 7 (2006) (quoting Senator Robert C. Byrd). 
‡  ROY JENKINS, MR. BALFOUR’S POODLE: PEERS V. PEOPLE 10, 42–44 (1954) (quoting Prime Minis-
ter David Lloyd George attacking the veto held by the House of Lords prior to the Parliament Act of 
1911 by noting that the peers were acting in a partisan fashion to support the Tory opposition leader in 
the House of Commons). 
1  See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE 
BAR OF POLITICS 16 (2d ed. 1986) (coining “counter-majoritarian difficulty” to describe judicial re-
view); see also U.S. SENATE COMM. ON RULES AND ADMIN., STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, S. DOC. 
NO. 110-9, at 16–17 (2007) (Rule XXII(2)), available at http://rules.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?
p=RuleXXII (stating that on most questions whether a Senate debate “shall be brought to a close[] . . . 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
 304 
who could represent less than forty-one percent of the population due to the 
malapportionment of the Senate,2 can veto most legislation and presidential 
nominations by refusing to invoke cloture.  A vote against cloture by that 
Senate minority sustains debate indefinitely as a filibuster.  Although the 
filibuster is woven into our political folklore and critical to the legislative 
process, few legal scholars have examined the practice.3  This lack of inter-
est is surprising because the presumption that a supermajority is required 
for most Senate action is a recent development that casts a shadow over 
democratic self-government.4   
This Essay evaluates the tradition of unlimited debate in the Senate and 
argues that a refusal to vote for cloture should result in a suspensory rather 
                                                                                                                           
shall be decided . . . by three-fifths of the Senators duly chosen and sworn” (internal quotation mark 
omitted)). 
2  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1 (“The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Sena-
tors from each State . . . .”).  The structure of the Senate is clearly contrary to the Supreme Court’s “one-
person, one-vote” decisions.  See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 574 (1964) (rejecting the federal 
analogy to the apportionment of state legislatures because “[t]he system of representation in the two 
Houses of the Federal Congress is one ingrained in our Constitution, as part of the law of the land.  It is 
one conceived out of compromise and concession indispensable to the establishment of our federal re-
public.”).  It is also possible that forty-one senators can represent more than fifty percent of the popula-
tion, thus one cannot say that the filibuster is always countermajoritarian. 
3  See SARAH A. BINDER & STEVEN S. SMITH, POLITICS OR PRINCIPLE? FILIBUSTERING IN THE 
UNITED STATES SENATE 1 (1997) (“Perhaps no feature of legislative procedure has received more atten-
tion—and less scrutiny—than the Senate filibuster.”); Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Fili-
buster, 49 STAN. L. REV. 181, 183 (1997) (“[L]egal scholars have paid only limited attention to the 
filibusters.”); Michael J. Gerhardt, The Constitutionality of the Filibuster, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 445, 
446 (2004) (“[V]ery few legal scholars have devoted serious attention to the filibuster.”); cf. MR. SMITH 
GOES TO WASHINGTON (Columbia Pictures 1939) (glamorizing the filibuster).  There are exceptions to 
the cloture rule, most notably in the reconciliation process that governs the federal budget.  See 2 U.S.C. 
§ 907(b)–(d) (2006); Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra, at 215 (“Under the congressional legislation governing 
the budget, all budget reconciliation legislation is considered under procedural rules that strictly limit the 
time for debate and other procedural delay.  Reconciliation bills cannot be filibustered because the time 
for debate is strictly limited by statute.” (footnote omitted)). 
The fact that sweeping health care was enacted in 2010 via reconciliation does not eliminate the need 
for filibuster reform.  That result was possible only because the Senate invoked cloture and approved the 
initial version of the bill when Democrats had sixty votes.  After that, both houses passed a separate rec-
onciliation bill to smooth over the differences between the two chambers.  This kind of political con-
junction is rare.  
4  See WAWRO & SCHICKLER, supra note †, at 157 (“In the contemporary Senate, with the exception 
of budget legislation and other bills where statutory requirements restrict minority obstruction, it is safe 
to assume that a 60% majority is generally necessary to adopt major legislation.  In the pre-cloture Sen-
ate, no such assumption appears appropriate.”); Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 3, at 199 (“[F]rom the 
late 1920s until the late 1960s, the filibuster became almost entirely associated with the battle over civil 
rights” and was not used on other issues.); Gerhardt, supra note 3, at 452 (pointing out that Senate liber-
als opposed the filibuster on principle during the civil rights era).  
The President can circumvent filibusters of his nominees to some extent by making recess appoint-
ments.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3 (“The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that may 
happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire at the End of their 
next Session.”).  The Senate, however, can block this maneuver by holding nominal sessions every day 
(e.g., for two minutes).  There cannot be a recess appointment without a recess. 
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than an absolute veto.5  In other words, forty-one senators should be able to 
extend debate on bills or nominations that reach the floor for no more than 
one year.  My proposal is modeled on the power of the British House of 
Lords to block most bills passed by the House of Commons from becoming 
law for a maximum of one year.6  I argue that such a system would strike a 
better balance between a majority’s right to rule and the minority’s right to 
be heard.  A suspensory veto under Rule XXII would also return the Senate 
to its traditional practice, which let a determined majority get its way except 
at the end of a Congress when claims of undue haste were more legitimate.7  
 
5  This Essay assumes that Rule XXII is constitutional, or at least that no court would invalidate a 
long-standing Senate rule.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2 (“Each House may determine the Rules of 
its Proceedings . . . .”); Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 3, at 243 (“History strongly suggests that allow-
ing Congress to implement a supermajority voting rule is constitutionally acceptable.”); Gerhardt, supra 
note 3, at 449 (“[T]he filibuster is best understood as a classic example of a nonreviewable, legislative 
constitutional judgment.”). 
6  See Parliament Act, 1949, 12, 13 & 14 Geo. 6, c. 103, § 1 (U.K.) (stating that the House of Com-
mons may enact a bill over the objection of the House of Lords by passing the bill in two consecutive 
sessions); Parliament Act, 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 13, § 1(1) (U.K.) (providing that money bills may be 
enacted by the House of Commons over the objections of the Lords after a one-month delay).  Part II.B 
explains how this rule emerged and why that history is pertinent for the Senate cloture debate. 
7  See BINDER & SMITH, supra note 3, at 6 (“Taking advantage of the constitutionally mandated ad-
journment of Congress on March 4 of the odd-numbered years [prior to the Twentieth Amendment], 
senators perfected the art of exploiting the rules at the end of the session to block action on measures 
they opposed . . . .”); Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 3, at 195 (“The early filibusters were largely un-
successful in blocking legislation; almost every filibustered measure before 1880 was eventually 
passed.”).  A majority with intense preferences almost always prevailed, because it could threaten to end 
obstruction through a ruling by the presiding officer, which is now called the “nuclear” or “constitu-
tional” option.  See WAWRO & SCHICKLER, supra note †, at 11 (arguing “that the mutability of the Sen-
ate’s rules was an important constraint on obstructive behavior in the 19th century”); Martin B. Gold & 
Dimple Gupta, The Constitutional Option to Change Senate Rules and Procedures: A Majoritarian 
Means to Overcome the Filibuster, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 205, 260−61 (2004) (explaining how a 
majority could invoke cloture by tabling a ruling from the presiding officer that any further debate on a 
pending motion is out of order); infra text accompanying notes 31−35.  
This Essay takes no position on whether a majority can amend the cloture rule or whether Rule 
XXII’s statement that a two-thirds vote is required is controlling.  Compare Gerhardt, supra note 3, at 
445 n.* (stating that the nuclear option “is illegal and constitutes an unfortunate breach of the Senate’s 
heretofore unbroken practice of amending its rules in strict accordance with its rules”), with John C. 
Roberts, Majority Voting in Congress: Further Notes on the Constitutionality of the Senate Cloture 
Rule, 20 J.L. & POL. 505, 507 (2004) (“[T]he Cloture Rule, and therefore the filibuster rule itself, are in 
fact subject to the will of a simple majority of the Senate at any time.  I argue that this is true both as a 
matter of Senate practice and of constitutional principle.”).  I also do not address whether, if a two-thirds 
vote is required, it is an unlawful entrenchment of cloture.  Compare Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 3, 
at 185 (stating that Rule XXII is unconstitutional because it “impermissibly entrenches the views of to-
day’s Senate by dictating rules for future Congresses”), with Gerhardt, supra note 3, at 448 (“Article I 
contains no explicit or implicit antientrenchment principle that would preclude the Senate from adopting 
procedural rules that carry over from one session to the next and may only be altered with supermajority 
approval.”).  For a thoughtful discussion on the automatic continuation of Senate rules from one Con-
gress to the next, see Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Burying the “Continuing Body” Theory of the Senate, 95 
IOWA. L. REV. 1401 (2010). 
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The main reason why cloture should be reformed is that unlimited Sen-
ate debate is now little more than a legal fiction.8  Under the modern two-
track legislative calendar that allows the Senate to proceed to other business 
while a bill or nomination is being filibustered, a vote against cloture does 
not lead to extended floor debate⎯it leads to no floor debate.9  The Major-
ity Leader almost always pulls the disputed bill (or does not bring it forward 
in the first place) and turns to something else.10  Since it is impractical to 
end the two-track system because of senators’ aversion to the unpleasant 
schedule that is created by round-the-clock speeches, there is no persuasive 
deliberative basis for the current cloture rule.11  On the other hand, solici-
tude for minority rights and a desire to stop laws from being rushed through 
without appropriate scrutiny suggest that permitting the majority to end a 
debate at any time would be wrong.  Ironically, the House of Lords, which 
is the least studied or respected legislative body in any major democracy,12 
offers the best way of thinking about the filibuster.  The Lords’ suspensory 
veto is the product of nearly a century of debate in Britain about the role 
 
8  See Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 3, at 184 (“The modern filibuster, by contrast, has little to do 
with deliberation and even less to do with debate.  The modern filibuster is simply a minority veto, and a 
powerful one at that.”); cf. BINDER & SMITH, supra note 3, at 1 (“According to conventional wisdom, 
the right of unrestricted debate in the Senate helps moderate extreme legislation, blocks passage of 
measures opposed by a popular majority, and is inseparable from the origins and traditions of the Senate.  
Such claims are, in fact, mostly myth: there is scarce theoretical or empirical support for much of the 
received wisdom about the Senate filibuster.”). 
9  See Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 3, at 201 (“In response to repeated civil rights filibusters, 
Majority Leader Mike Mansfield developed a system whereby the Senate would spend the morning on 
the filibustered legislation and the afternoon on other business.”); Gold & Gupta, supra note 7, at 252–
53 (“By 1975, the Senate had implemented a ‘two-track system’ for considering legislation, which al-
lowed the Senate to ‘continue to work on all other legislation on one “track,” while a filibuster against a 
particular piece of legislation [wa]s theoretically in progress on the other “track.”’” (alteration in origi-
nal) (quoting 94 CONG. REC. 928, 928 (1975) (statement of Sen. Cranston)).  
10  See WAWRO & SCHICKLER, supra note †, at 259–60 (“If the supporting coalition behind a piece 
of major legislation is not large enough to invoke cloture, the legislation is not likely even to make it to 
the floor.”); Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 3, at 203 (“A credible threat that forty-one senators will 
refuse to vote for cloture on a bill is enough to keep that bill off the floor.”). 
11  See BINDER & SMITH, supra note 3, at 216 (“Party leaders—trying to cater to their members’ fre-
quent requests for a more predictable and family-friendly (let alone fundraising friendly) schedule—are 
unlikely to want to enforce round-the-clock filibusters at the expense of creating a logjam of important 
legislative business.”); see also WAWRO & SCHICKLER, supra note †, at 262 (“[I]t is the choice of a ma-
jority not to engage obstructing senators in a war of attrition.”). 
12  See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 63, at 430 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (calling 
the House of Lords a “hereditary assembly of opulent nobles”); see also WALTER BAGEHOT, THE 
ENGLISH CONSTITUTION 95 (Cosimo Classics photo. reprint 2007) (1873) (stating that the House of 
Peers was inferior because “[t]he qualities which fit a man for marked eminence, in a deliberative as-
sembly, are not hereditary, and are not coupled with great estates”); JENKINS, supra note ‡, at 55 (quot-
ing Winston Churchill’s view that the Lords was a “one-sided, hereditary, unprized, unrepresentative, 
irresponsible absentee”).  Most of the hereditary peers were finally removed from the House of Lords in 
1999, see House of Lords Act, 1999, c. 34 (U.K.), and now most of its members are lifetime appointees, 
see Life Peerages Act, 1958, 6 & 7 Eliz. 2, c. 21 (U.K.).  Indeed, I cannot find any law review articles 
that take a close look at the legislative procedures of the House of Lords.  
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that countermajoritarian practices should play within a democratic legisla-
ture, and thus it is analogous to the ongoing debate over the proper scope of 
minority rights within the Senate. 
Convincing people that the filibuster should be turned into a suspen-
sory veto is one thing; convincing the Senate to adopt this idea is something 
else.  Public pressure forced the adoption of the first cloture rule in 1917,13 
but that may not be enough this time.  In some cases, the Senate responds 
only to institutional pressure.  For instance, when reformers sought to end 
the power of one-third of the Senate to control Native American policy by 
rejecting tribal treaties, the House of Representatives refused to appropriate 
funds for those treaties and forced the Senate to agree that the tribes should 
always be regulated by ordinary legislation.14  When progressives could not 
get a Senate supermajority to pass the proposed Seventeenth Amendment, 
which provided for the direct election of senators, almost two-thirds of state 
legislatures petitioned for a constitutional convention, and the Senate gave 
way.15  And when internationalists in the 1940s wanted to make sure that a 
Senate minority could not repeat the mistake of rejecting the League of Na-
tions, the House passed a constitutional amendment abolishing the treaty 
ratification process, and the Senate accepted the idea that a congressional-
executive agreement passed just like a bill could be the legal equivalent of a 
treaty.16  Obtaining cloture reform may require this kind of robust action 
from other elected officials. 
Part I traces the evolution of the filibuster and argues that the current 
version should not be retained because it is inconsistent with the majori-
tarian tradition of the Senate.  Part II argues for suspensory cloture and ex-
amines how concerns about the lack of democracy within Parliament led to 
the creation of a similar rule for the House of Lords.  Part III explores past 
cases where the Senate was strong-armed into giving up its prerogatives and 
provides some suggestions on how that could be done to reform the filibus-
ter.   
 
13  See ROBERT MANN, THE WALLS OF JERICHO: LYNDON JOHNSON, HUBERT HUMPHREY, RICHARD 
RUSSELL, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS 79 (1996) (stating that President Woodrow Wilson 
“shamed senators into enacting a cloture rule” after a filibuster blocked a bill to arm merchant ships); 
Gold & Gupta, supra note 7, at 217–19 (describing public outrage at this end-of-session filibuster by 
eleven isolationist Senators). 
14  See Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 120, 16 Stat. 544, 566 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 71 (2006)) (abolish-
ing the tribal treaty system); Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194, 201–02 (1975) (describing this 
struggle in the 1860s and 1870s); see generally U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (stating that “two thirds of 
the Senators present” must concur to ratify a treaty). 
15  See Gerard N. Magliocca, State Calls for an Article Five Convention: Mobilization and Interpre-
tation, 2009 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 74, 79–81, http://www.cardozolawreview.com/content/denovo/
Magliocca_2009_74.pdf (describing this showdown over the Seventeenth Amendment). 
16  See BRUCE ACKERMAN & DAVID GOLOVE, IS NAFTA CONSTITUTIONAL? 89–96 (1995) (describ-
ing how the Senate relinquished its treaty monopoly during the mid-1940s); see also JOHN MILTON 
COOPER, JR., WOODROW WILSON 506–59 (2009) (recounting the Senate debate over the Treaty of Ver-
sailles). 
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I. THE HISTORY OF UNLIMITED DEBATE 
This Part looks at the gradual shift of the Senate’s norms with respect 
to floor debate.  Given the current premise that it takes sixty senators to get 
anything significant done, it be may startling to learn that for most of its 
history the Senate functioned on the assumption that a simple majority was 
sufficient unless an issue was taken up in the closing days of a Congress.17  
During that era, which lasted until the 1970s, unlimited debate was mainly a 
procedural device that protected free speech, improved the quality of delib-
eration, and revealed the intensity of preferences in the Senate.18  But today 
cloture is mostly a substantive supermajority voting rule that does not ac-
complish these traditional goals and is difficult to justify on other grounds.   
A. Folkways in the Traditional Senate 
The best place to start is by asking how the Senate got anything done 
before 1917, when unanimous consent was necessary to cut off debate and 
move to a final vote.19  Common sense says that senators could not have 
 
17  See WAWRO & SCHICKLER, supra note †, at 28 (“When an issue was salient to both the majority 
and the minority, the pre-cloture Senate was essentially majoritarian, with the sole caveat being that fili-
busters in the final few days of a congress posed by a genuine threat to legislation.”); see also BINDER & 
SMITH, supra note 3, at 5 (“It was widely assumed in these first decades that measures would be brought 
to a vote for final consideration and that a simple majority would be sufficient for ending debate on even 
the most controversial legislative business.”).  After all, plenty of legislation passed the Senate with less 
than two-thirds support prior to 1975, when cloture required a two-thirds vote.  See MANN, supra note 
13, at 519–20 (listing the versions of Rule XXII from 1917 to 1975).  And bills or nominations did not 
require unanimity before 1917, when there was no cloture rule at all. Id. 
18  See WAWRO & SCHICKLER, supra note †, at 36 (“[F]ilibusters (and efforts to fight obstruction) 
can signal the intensity of constituent support or opposition to a position, which should prove to be elec-
torally useful information for all senators.”).  Needless to say, not all filibusters are enlightening.  See 
FRANKLIN L. BURDETTE, FILIBUSTERING IN THE SENATE 3–4 (1940) (describing Senator Huey Long’s 
1935 filibuster in which he read recipes for “potlikker” and Roquefort salad dressing). 
I am not going to spend any time discussing the free speech or quality-of-discussion issues, as I think 
it is rather obvious that these values are protected or enhanced by unlimited debate on the floor. 
19  See, e.g., ROBERT A. CARO, MASTER OF THE SENATE: THE YEARS OF LYNDON JOHNSON 92 
(2002) (“For many years after 1806—for 111 years, to be precise—the only way a senator could be 
made to stop talking so that a vote could be taken on a proposed measure was if there was unanimous 
consent that he do so, an obvious impossibility.”).  From 1789 until 1806, the Senate did have a rule pro-
viding that a majority could call the previous question.  See Gold & Gupta, supra note 7, at 213 (“The 
previous question being moved and seconded, the question for the chair shall be: ‘Shall the main ques-
tion now be put?’ and if the nays prevail, the main question shall not then be put.” (quoting RULES 
ADOPTED BY THE FIRST SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES RULE IX, 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 20−21 (Joseph 
Gales ed., 1789)); id. at 215–16 (quoting Vice President Aaron Burr’s rationale recommending “the abo-
lition of that respecting the previous question, which he said had in the four years been only once taken, 
and that upon an amendment.  This was proof that it could not be necessary, and all its purposes were 
certainly much better answered by the question of indefinite postponement.” (quoting 1 MEMOIRS OF 
JOHN QUINCY ADAMS 365 (Charles Francis Adams ed., 1874)).  Scholars disagree about the purpose of 
the previous question rule in part because the Senate’s early records are incomplete.  See Fisk & 
Chemerinsky, supra note 3, at 188 (“Both friends and foes of filibusters in the Senate have attempted to 
find in the previous question motion a pedigree for their views on whether the early Senate allowed 
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viewed unanimous consent as the equivalent of a voting rule on the merits.  
In those days, the Senate was smaller and not very busy.  This allowed its 
members to foster cooperative norms and discourage dilatory tactics.20  
Moreover, Senate precedent held that the rulings of the presiding officer, 
backed by a majority of the chamber, could be used to limit obstruction.21  
As a result, there were almost no successful filibusters before the 1880s.22   
One reason the Senate functioned well without a cloture rule for so 
long is because its small size allowed that body to reach an informal under-
standing that a majority should prevail once everyone had a chance to ex-
press his opinion.  There is nothing novel about the suggestion that a small 
community engaged in repeated interactions is likely to settle on a set of 
mutually beneficial norms.23  Not only is there an advantage to reciprocity 
under those conditions, but there are also high costs to disruptive behavior 
because of its visibility and the ability of a tight-knit group to stick together 
and shun those who do not conform to the prevailing institutional culture.24  
The growth in the Senate’s ranks during the nineteenth and twentieth centu-
ries undermined that informal system, but it is hard to say that this increase 
did much to change the filibuster.25 
                                                                                                                           
unlimited debate, but the historical record resists simple characterization.  It is unclear whether the pre-
vious question, in the form then practiced, served as a device to bring a measure to a vote, or whether it 
served to defer discussion of sensitive or embarrassing questions.  The one issue on which both sides 
agree, however, is that the previous question motion was seldom used before the Senate abolished it in 
the 1806.” (footnotes omitted)); cf. BURDETTE, supra note 18, at 16 (“Debates in Congress were often 
scantily reported, and in the Senate they were secret till 1794.”). 
20  Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 3, at 184 (“[T]he smaller size, lighter workload, and more colle-
gial culture of the pre-1950 Senate imposed significant limits on the ability of the minority to use the 
filibuster to thwart the majority.”); see also BURDETTE, supra note 18, at 14 (“Tactics patently obstruc-
tive, however, were characteristic of the House long before they became common in the Senate.  That 
fact may be ascribed to the small membership of the early Senate and to the dignity and polished polite-
ness with which its proceedings were conducted . . . .”).   
21  See, e.g., WAWRO & SCHICKLER, supra note †, at 27–28 (“Senators understood that a determined 
majority, particularly when supported by a sympathetic presiding officer, could implement new prece-
dents that neutralized minority obstruction.”).  To take a modern example, in 1969 Vice President 
Hubert Humphrey issued a ruling that the Senate could, at the start of a new Congress, invoke cloture by 
a simple majority on a proposed change to Rule XXII itself.  See Gold & Gupta, supra note 7, at 251.  A 
majority of the Senate (53–45) rejected this ruling, see id. at 252, but the point is that only a majority 
was necessary to uphold the ruling of the chair.  
22  See BURDETTE, supra note 18, at 35–39 (discussing an unsuccessful 1879 filibuster and conclud-
ing that “on the whole, it had been a device remarkably unsuccessful; almost every obstructed measure 
was eventually passed despite filibustering opposition”). 
23  See generally ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE 
DISPUTES (1991) (exploring the development of self-enforcing norms and informal rules). 
24  See WAWRO & SCHICKLER, supra note †, at 50–54 (discussing some examples of norm enforce-
ment against troublesome senators, though noting that the proof and effectiveness of these informal 
sanctions is unclear). 
25  See 27 CONG. REC. 45−46 (1894) (statement of Sen. Vest) (criticizing unlimited debate given the 
increased size of the Senate).  The Senate is almost the same size as it was in 1912 (only Hawaii and 
Alaska were added as states in the 1950s), yet the practice of unlimited debate, as the text explains, 
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Another explanation for the lack of a cloture rule was that the threat of 
obstruction through unlimited debate was hollow for much of the Senate’s 
history because senators did not have much to do.  In 1827, for example, a 
journalist noted that the Senate usually met from noon until three and did 
not meet five days a week.26  Without much to occupy its time on the floor, 
a majority could easily afford to wait out any attempt to bring the Senate’s 
business to a halt, which in turn made it unlikely that anybody would try.27  
The exception was at the end of a Congress, when dilatory tactics could not 
be brushed aside by patience, because the time available for debate was 
scarce.28  In 1917, the Senate decided that it needed a cloture rule to stop 
these last-minute filibusters by allowing two-thirds of the Senate to end de-
bate, which was an effort to balance the desire to prevent bills from being 
rushed through before an adjournment with the view that a handful of sena-
tors should not be able to veto legislation.29  The rest of the time, though, 
the slack in the calendar gave the majority broad latitude to govern.30 
                                                                                                                           
changed dramatically during that time.  It may be, though, that the increasing size of the Senate explains 
the breakdown of norms against end-of-session filibusters in the late nineteenth century. 
26  See BINDER & SMITH, supra note 3, at 40 (citing journalist Ben Perley Poore’s observation of the 
Senate’s “rather leisurely schedule”). 
27  See id. at 42 (“Hardly in a rush to conclude business on a host of pressing issues, Senate majori-
ties would have had the liberty of sitting out any set of obstructive senators, knowing that they would 
not be putting a heavy agenda at risk.”); BURDETTE, supra note 18, at 34 (“Earlier filibusters had been 
extended, but for the most part they were virtually uncontested; habitually the majority had abjectly even 
if impatiently waited for release by the minority.”).  
28  See WAWRO & SCHICKLER, supra note †, at 121 (estimating that about a third of the filibusters or 
dilatory tactics employed prior to the establishment of the cloture rule in 1917 occurred in the final thirty 
days of a Congress); Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 3, at 202 n.114 (“Many filibusters occurred during 
the short sessions that ended at noon on the March 4th after an election.”); see also BURDETTE, supra 
note 18, at 213 (“It has become axiomatic that filibusters can be conducted with greatest effectiveness 
for a given quota of exertion near the time for final adjournment, and for that reason they are most fre-
quent at the ends of sessions.”).  There is an analogy here to the President’s “pocket veto” power, which 
allows him to kill a bill passed at the end of a Congress by refusing to act on it.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, 
cl. 2 (“If any Bill shall not be returned by the President within ten Days (Sundays excepted) after it shall 
have been presented to him, the Same shall be a Law, in like Manner as if he had signed it, unless the 
Congress by their Adjournment prevent its Return, in which Case it shall not be a Law.”).  In effect, Ar-
ticle I gives the President a ten-day suspensory veto. 
29  See WAWRO & SCHICKLER, supra note †, at 125 (stating that as norms of restraint “began to 
break down in the late-19th century, even large majorities were by no means assured of success in the 
waning days of a Congress.  This breakdown of informal restraints, in turn, motivated senators to move 
toward a formal cloture rule that reduced the uncertainty posed by late-congress filibusters by small mi-
norities”); cf. Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 3, at 197 (quoting President Wilson’s denunciation of an 
end-of-session filibuster that led to the creation of the cloture rule, in which he observed that “[m]ore 
than 500 of the 531 members of the two houses were ready and anxious to act; the House of Representa-
tives had acted, by an overwhelming majority; but the Senate was unable to act because a little group of 
eleven senators had determined that it should not.” (quoting 41 THE PAPERS OF WOODROW WILSON 
319−20 (Arthur S. Link ed., 1983)). 
30  The debate on the 1890 “Force Bill,” which would have strengthened federal protection of voting 
rights in the South, is frequently cited as an example of a successful filibuster.  See BURDETTE, supra 
note 18, at 52–57.  In that instance, though, a majority decided to set aside the bill after being per-
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Permitting unlimited debate was also not a problem because a majority 
could credibly threaten to create a cloture rule if a minority violated the 
Senate’s custom by refusing to allow a bill to move to a final vote.31  If a 
member made a point of order stating that debate on a pending matter 
should end or that a particular parliamentary tactic was inappropriate, the 
presiding officer could sustain the motion and have his ruling upheld by a 
simple majority.32  That ruling would then be a binding precedent under 
long-standing Senate practice.  While there was no time limit on a debate of 
the presiding officer’s ruling, a filibuster on that action could be preempted 
by a motion to table, as that motion was not debatable.33  This sort of proce-
dure was invoked many times so that senators bent on obstruction knew that 
they could not go too far without creating a backlash.34  Oddly enough, the 
establishment of Rule XXII probably made it harder to stop a filibuster by 
removing the ambiguity surrounding unlimited debate.  That is why the 
prospect of ending the sixty-vote cloture requirement through a ruling by 
the presiding officer is now often referred to as the “nuclear” option, be-
cause many view the idea as contrary to the rules of the Senate.35 
                                                                                                                           
suaded—following a lengthy discussion—that it should not pass.  See id. at 57 (stating that the motion to 
pull the bill from the floor passed 35–34); see also WAWRO & SCHICKLER, supra note †, at 4 (“[T]he 
record suggests that Republicans lacked a floor majority for both cloture and the Elections Bill itself.”).  
31  See Gold & Gupta, supra note 7, at 220–69 (undertaking an exhaustive examination of cases 
where the threat of a majority to end unlimited debate led to rule changes endorsed by a supermajority of 
the Senate). 
32  See WAWRO & SCHICKLER, supra note †, at 68 (“[T]here are examples in which the chair made a 
controversial ruling, and it was then appealed and sustained by a majority vote without a filibuster of the 
appeal.”); id. (“We have found no examples of appeals of rulings by a chair being successfully filibus-
tered in the 19th century . . . .”).  For controversial rulings, the presiding officer was normally the Vice 
President.  U.S. CONST. art I, § 3, cl. 4 (“The Vice President of the United States shall be President of 
the Senate, but shall have no vote, unless they be equally divided.”). 
33  See WAWRO & SCHICKLER, supra note †, at 33 (“A motion to table the appeal is not debatable, 
and tabling an appeal requires only a simple majority vote.  Once an appeal has been tabled, the ruling is 
considered to be sustained and to constitute a precedent, which is just as binding as a standing rule.  
Avoiding additional obstruction on the appeal of a chair’s ruling would simply require that the chair first 
recognize an individual friendly to the ruling who will make the motion to table.” (footnotes omitted)).  
34  See id. at 70 (providing a set of examples where procedural rulings established precedents that 
limited obstruction); id. at 68–69 (“[C]hairs issued controversial new rulings in the 19th century, and it 
does not appear that the minority used obstruction to block such rulings from taking effect.”); cf. Gold & 
Gupta, supra note 7, at 260 (“Each time the Senate rules have been amended, the body has followed the 
rules-change procedure set forth in the rules themselves.  Yet, on at least four occasions those changes 
were forced by attempts to use the constitutional option,” which refers to obtaining a favorable ruling 
from the presiding officer.). 
35  See WAWRO & SCHICKLER, supra note †, at 273 (“In today’s Senate, implementing the nuclear 
option appears to run afoul of the explicit rules of the Senate in a manner that did not hold prior to 1917.  
It is critical to emphasize that a floor majority can still choose to go nuclear, but doing so poses height-
ened political risks since it can effectively be portrayed as violating a long-standing explicit rule of the 
Senate.”); see supra note 7 (noting the divided opinion on the nuclear option). 
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Finally, the Senate could indulge unlimited debate because filibusters 
were physically taxing.36  Only a zealous minority would have the strength 
to hold the floor for days or weeks.  The physically taxing nature of filibus-
ters discouraged obstruction and provided valuable information about how 
strongly each side felt about the issue being discussed.37  One criticism of 
“yes-or-no” voting rules is that they do not measure preference intensity 
and can provide a false impression of majority opinion.38  The decision to 
conduct a filibuster, by contrast, sent a signal that some senators were 
fiercely opposed to a pending bill, which might cause the majority to re-
think its views.39  Likewise, a majority’s choice to keep a challenged bill on 
the floor and forsake all other legislative action until it passed showed its 
commitment to an issue and might cause the minority to relent.40  Thus, 
there was a strong argument that the lack of a cloture rule (or the lack of 
one that a majority could easily invoke) improved the deliberative process. 
Most scholars agree that the adoption of Rule XXII did little to change 
the Senate’s culture, but an exception emerged to the premise that the ma-
jority should prevail on the floor for civil rights legislation.41  Bills attacking 
 
36  Engaging in unlimited debate is also politically taxing, as it is a highly visible act that can back-
fire if there are relevant constituencies in favor of the bill under discussion.  Cf. Fisk & Chemerinsky, 
supra note 3, at 206 (“Now, of course, C-SPAN coverage of floor proceedings would make it even eas-
ier for the public to know about filibusters, which would substantially limit their use.  In an era of public 
concern over ‘gridlock’ in Washington, most senators would not want their constituents to witness an 
old-fashioned filibuster.”). 
37  See WAWRO & SCHICKLER, supra note †, at 18 (“The key question in pre-cloture filibuster battles 
was which side had the greater resolve to bear such costs in order to secure its favored outcome.  We 
argue that this institutional context fostered confrontations that were akin to game-theoretic models of 
‘wars of attrition’ and that electorally relevant information conveyed through filibuster battles helps to 
explain why a legislature would choose to allow minorities to obstruct business in the first place.”). 
38  See, e.g., Kevin A. Kordana, Political Parties as Donative Intermediaries, 85 VA. L. REV. 1683, 
1683–84 (1999) (discussing “one of the crucial problems of democracy: Voting does not take account of 
individual voters’ intensity of preference”). 
39  See WAWRO & SCHICKLER, supra note †, at 18.  The decision to filibuster at the end of a Con-
gress is not indicative of intense minority opposition because the cost of obstruction is lower (e.g., if 
only four hours remain until adjournment, then someone just needs to give a four-hour speech to kill a 
bill).  On the other hand, one might say that the fact that a bill is brought to the floor at such a late date 
indicates that it is a low priority for a Senate majority, and hence the bill should be defeated if an intense 
minority thinks it is a bad idea. 
40  The best example was the filibuster of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which lasted for three 
months until cloture was invoked.  See MANN, supra note 13, at 406–28 (discussing this debate). 
41  See Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 3, at 198–99 (“For nearly fifty years after its adoption, Rule 
XXII served a purpose more symbolic than real.  Between 1917 and 1927, cloture was voted on only ten 
times and it was adopted only four times.  Between 1931 and the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, cloture was seldom sought and only twice obtained.  The reluctance to seek cloture and the diffi-
culty of obtaining it resulted in large part from the battle over civil rights . . . .” (footnotes omitted)); see 
also MANN, supra note 13, at 79 (“An accumulation of interpretations and precedents in the years fol-
lowing 1917—declaring that the Senate could end debate on measures but not on motions or procedural 
questions—had left the cloture rule largely impotent and meaningless.”).  Filibusters still occurred in the 
waning days of a Congress, as they had before 1917. 
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lynching, segregation, or the denial of voting rights to African-Americans 
were always filibustered and could not pass without a two-thirds vote.42  
While the civil rights exception was a harbinger of cloture’s change in em-
phasis from a procedural device into a substantive one, until the 1970s no 
other legislation faced this extraordinary hurdle.43  Southern senators who 
opposed federal civil rights wanted to avoid cloture reform, and so they re-
frained from filibustering anything else.44  At the same time, liberals who 
saw civil rights as the crucial issue felt that they should not legitimize fili-
busters and therefore never joined one.45  The enactment of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 brought this era to an end 
and ushered in the conception of the filibuster that is the source of concern 
today.46 
B. The Two-Track System and Supermajority Rule 
Over the past four decades, the Senate abandoned the expectation that 
the majority should prevail and shifted toward supermajority rule.  A major 
reason for that shift was an increase in legislative business.47  The growth of 
the welfare and administrative state makes floor-debate time much more 
precious and makes it far more costly for the Senate to be tied up by a fili-
 
42  See BINDER & SMITH, supra note 3, at 136 (“[B]y the mid-twentieth century it is clear that civil 
rights measures as a class were the dominant subject of measures that can reasonably be claimed to have 
been killed by filibuster.  And the connection between civil rights and the cloture rule was plain to eve-
ryone.”). 
43  See Roberts, supra note 7, at 521 (“Filibusters were not seen as a general threat to legislation dur-
ing this period, and were not often used, except against civil rights legislation.”).  The proce-
dural/substantive distinction in the text is not absolute, as the traditional filibuster had a substantive 
component with respect to blocking a bill at the end of a Congress.  Likewise, a modern filibuster still 
can further some procedural values (e.g., revealing preference intensity) in the right circumstances.  The 
point is that unlimited debate used to be mostly a deliberative tool, and it now operates mostly as a sub-
stantive voting rule. 
44  See Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 3, at 200 (“[T]he Southern Democrats monopolized filibus-
tering as an anti-civil rights device.”).  Another argument is that conservatives dominated the committee 
system in this period and thus had no need to filibuster.  See BINDER & SMITH, supra note 3, at 89 (“The 
conservative coalition was generally satisfied to have little new legislation pass and, because it consti-
tuted a majority of the Senate during much of this period, did not have to resort to the filibuster to block 
liberal legislation.  Only on civil rights measures, which were attractive to many Republicans, did south-
erners regularly have to resort to filibusters or threaten filibusters to kill undesirable legislation . . . .”). 
45  See, e.g., Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 3, at 200 (“[T]he debate about civil rights legislation 
became fused with the debate about filibusters and cloture: Conservatives defended them and liberals 
opposed them.”). 
46  See Bruce Ackerman & Jennifer Nou, Canonizing the Civil Rights Revolution: The People and 
the Poll Tax, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 63, 90–110 (2009) (describing the legislative history of the Voting 
Rights Act); see also Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 3, at 199 (“The filibuster against the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 was unequaled in length and notoriety; it tied up the Senate for seventy-four days.”). 
47  See Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 3, at 186 (“[T]he filibuster is a more significant institutional 
problem in the Senate today.  The huge increase in Congress’ workload over the last forty years largely 
accounts for this.”); see also BINDER & SMITH, supra note 3, at 13 (“The expansion of the Senate’s 
workload in recent decades has no doubt made it easier for senators to obstruct chamber business.”). 
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buster.48  In effect, an entire Congress now faces the sort of acute time pres-
sure that used to appear only in the last days of a Congress.  Thus, a minor-
ity now has a stronger incentive to obstruct because it knows that resistance 
is likely to force the majority to fold or bargain.  Moreover, the stigma that 
attached to voting against cloture during the civil rights era (for liberals on 
all issues and for conservatives on non-civil rights bills) vanished after 
1965, thus weakening the informal restraint on the use of unlimited de-
bate.49 
To avoid perpetual gridlock, the Senate started using a two-track sys-
tem that allowed the chamber to tackle other business (with unanimous con-
sent) for part of the day while a filibuster was alive on another issue.50  The 
two-track system reduced the cost of filibusters for the minority—it did not 
need to hold the floor constantly as in the past⎯and for the majority, which 
could withstand opposition without being forced to relinquish other legisla-
tive priorities.  In time, the two tracks existed only as a formal matter: 
whenever a credible filibuster threat was made, the contested matter was set 
aside entirely until the necessary votes for cloture were rounded up.51  There 
is no rule that mandates this practice; a majority can choose to keep a fili-
bustered bill on the floor and force the minority to endure the hardships of 
endless debate.52  But this almost never happens today. 
 
48  See BINDER & SMITH, supra note 3, at 15 (“Senators seeking to block action on a particular 
measure know that increased time pressures will often work in their favor: the heavier the agenda, the 
less likely that party leaders will be able to afford the time to wait out filibustering senators.”); WAWRO 
& SCHICKLER, supra note †, at 261 (“[F]ilibustering has become costless for bill opponents for the sim-
ple reason that the opportunity costs of waiting out a filibuster have become overwhelming when sena-
tors are confronted with extraordinarily tight scheduling constraints.”).  
49  See Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 3, at 201 (“The fusion of filibusters and civil rights issues 
rapidly dissolved in the 1970s when liberals began to filibuster and conservatives began to vote for clo-
ture.”).  It is also possible, though there is no evidence on this point, that lowering the cloture threshold 
from sixty-seven votes to sixty in 1975 made filibusters seem less extraordinary and more acceptable 
within the culture of the Senate. 
50  See BINDER & SMITH, supra note 3, at 15 (describing the two-track approach implemented as 
standard procedure by Majority Leader Mike Mansfield and his deputy, Senator Robert C. Byrd, in the 
1970s); WAWRO & SCHICKLER, supra note †, at 261 (“[T]he much-discussed multi-tracking system de-
vised by Mike Mansfield and Robert Byrd in the early 1970s is more a symptom of this transformation 
to costless filibustering than its cause.”).  The Senate sometimes used a two-track process before the 
1970s, but it is used almost all the time now.  See WAWRO & SCHICKLER, supra note †, at 262. 
51  See Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 3, at 186 (“We then describe the transformation of the fili-
buster from the old form of extended debate to its modern incarnation as ‘the stealth filibuster’⎯a cov-
ert procedural maneuver largely invisible to the public.”). 
52  In theory, a filibuster can be defeated if the Senate is kept in continuous session for a long enough 
period of time because no Senator is allowed to give more than two speeches on the same topic during a 
legislative day.  See U.S. SENATE COMM. ON RULES AND ADMIN, STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, S. 
DOC. NO. 110-9, at 14 (Rule XIX(1)(a)), available at http://rules.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?
p=RuleXIX.  Since a legislative day generally does not elapse until the Senate stands in recess, eventu-
ally all of the filibustering Senators would give their two speeches and not be able to gain recognition 
from the chair.  In practice, though, keeping the Senate going for a full legislative day is impossible. 
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Accordingly, the administration of Rule XXII is now sharply at odds 
with the purpose of unlimited debate.  Just a credible threat to vote against 
cloture stifles the exchange of ideas by ensuring in most cases that a con-
tested bill or nomination will not be debated on the floor.53  The modern 
filibuster does not enhance the quality of deliberation, protect the free 
speech of individual senators, or reveal preference intensity in the Senate.  
On the last point, since a minority only needs to say that it will refuse to 
vote for cloture, almost nothing is disclosed by that threat that is different 
from a vote on the merits.54  In effect, modern cloture practice operates as a 
gag rule. 
The best objection to this characterization is that a refusal to vote for 
cloture actually leads to more debate off of the Senate floor, but this argu-
ment is not convincing.  First, many matters held up by a filibuster threat 
probably just disappear and get no attention.  Second, if additional discus-
sion does occur as a result of Rule XXII, it usually takes place in the cata-
combs of the Capitol, out of the public eye.  Secret talks are a necessary 
part of the legislative process, of course, but it is hard to argue that we have 
too much transparency and that a supermajority cloture rule is the best anti-
dote.  The rare case where a Senate deadlock leads to passionate conversa-
tions on television, around dinner tables, and in barbershops does not make 
up for the vast majority of cases where a filibuster stifles that dialogue.   
Stripped of its procedural rationale, Rule XXII is reduced to a substan-
tive minority veto.  While the protection of minority rights is an important 
consideration, it is hard to see why a practice that is so inconsistent with the 
majoritarian tradition of the Senate should be retained.  The burden of proof 
should be on the proponents of the new supermajority threshold.  For ex-
ample, why should a three-fifths limit apply in the Senate but not in the 
House of Representatives?  Is there a good reason to require sixty senators 
 
53  A separate, though related, problem is the use of “holds,” whereby a senator privately informs the 
Majority Leader that unanimous consent will not be given on a pending matter unless certain conces-
sions are made.  See BINDER & SMITH, supra note 3, at 11–12 (describing holds).  The key problem with 
a hold is that by custom the Majority Leader does not reveal who has placed a hold on a particular item. 
Id.  There is no justification for this secrecy, as it just lets senators escape accountability for their ac-
tions.  For a discussion of how Lyndon Johnson pioneered the use of unanimous consent agreements to 
structure Senate debate when he was Majority Leader, see CARO, supra note 19, at 572–77. 
54  See WAWRO & SCHICKLER, supra note †, at 260 (“The contemporary context of lawmaking in the 
Senate has essentially eliminated the informational benefits that used to accrue from these kinds of bat-
tles.  The essential component that is now missing is that filibustering is virtually costless for bill oppo-
nents.  With costless filibustering, undertaking obstruction no longer signals that a proposed policy is 
particularly harmful to its foes.”). 
In fairness, there are situations in which the minority expresses a weak preference by voting for clo-
ture but against a pending matter on the merits.  That could be because a norm against filibustering is 
still strong, or because the issue has low political salience and thus constituents will not treat a vote for 
cloture as the equivalent of a final vote. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
 316 
to support ordinary legislation or nominations?55  These questions need an-
swers because minority rights in the Senate can be protected by something 
other than an absolute veto.  Nevertheless, the minority party in the Senate 
and the senators in the majority who straddle the sixtieth-vote line benefit 
from the current approach to cloture, which helps explain why we still have 
Rule XXII.  
One obvious cure would be for the majority to insist that all those in 
the minority be forced to hold the floor if they refuse to vote for cloture, but 
that is a bluff that can be called easily.  Enforcing round-the-clock debate 
would clearly make filibusters more costly for obstructionists because they 
would have to hold the floor constantly, but this kind of war of attrition 
would also be costly for the majority.56  Even the most fervent senators are 
not eager to sleep on cots in their offices, answer quorum calls in the dead 
of night, or have their other legislative and political priorities held hostage 
by a chaotic schedule.  Furthermore, having full-fledged filibusters would 
force many desirable bills off the floor and block their passage.57  The two-
track system, after all, was instituted because these repeated stalemates 
were considered harmful.  And since the Senate has steadfastly refused to 
abandon this procedure for nearly forty years despite calls to make the mi-
nority conduct a “real filibuster” on one issue or another, the prospect of 
that actually happening on a regular basis seems remote. 
In sum, the current practice of unlimited debate is inconsistent with the 
majoritarian premise that held sway in the Senate from 1789 until the 
1970s.  The procedural benefits of Rule XXII are all but gone given how 
the Senate now handles most cloture petitions, and there is no sound sub-
stantive basis for having a supermajority rule in just one house of Congress.  
Consequently, the analysis turns to how the filibuster should be reformed.  
II. A SUSPENSORY VETO AND THE HOUSE OF LORDS 
This Part argues that the cloture threshold should be changed into a 
temporary veto that a Senate majority can override after one year.58  Such a 
 
55  Setting aside the Constitution’s command that a Senate supermajority is necessary, for example, 
to ratify a constitutional amendment, one could make the case that for highly significant legislation there 
should be a norm that a narrow majority cannot act.  Rule XXII, however, is being applied more widely, 
and besides, nobody is suggesting that the rules in the House of Representatives should be changed to 
conform to that norm. 
56  See WAWRO & SCHICKLER, supra note †, at 263 (“[T]he great irony appears to be that filibusters 
have become costless for the minority because the costs to the majority of engaging in wars of attrition 
have become prohibitively high.”).  There is no doubt that in some instances the minority would relent 
rather than conduct a formal filibuster if they were forced to do so, but the filibusters that did occur 
would be incredibly time-consuming and destructive. 
57  This is especially true because many statutes have a definite expiration date (e.g., ones with sun-
set provisions) and therefore would lapse if the minority used the filibuster strategically. 
58  This kind of idea is certainly not original though the rationale offered here is new.  See 
BURDETTE, supra note 18, at 240 (“[I]t would seem salutary to adopt a system of majority cloture appli-
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reform would dilute the minority’s power to resist but retain the benefits of 
extended debate by encouraging dissenters to discuss contested issues on 
the floor and by letting them block items raised at the last minute.  The in-
spiration for a suspensory cloture rule is the United Kingdom’s House of 
Lords, which can delay but not defeat most bills passed by the elected 
House of Commons.59  Drawing an analogy between the Senate and the 
House of Lords is helpful not because they are the upper houses of their re-
spective legislatures but because the current authority of the Lords evolved 
only after a prolonged struggle establishing that a substantive (rather than 
procedural) minority veto could not be squared with a democratic parlia-
ment.60  Rule XXII presents a similar problem and can be addressed with 
the same remedy.  
A. A Compromise Proposal 
Given the flaws in the current filibuster procedure, the simplest reform 
would be to let the Senate majority cut off debate whenever it wants.  But 
this suggestion is unsound.  There are good reasons for having lengthy floor 
consideration on some issues if a debate actually occurs—senators might 
learn something or be persuaded to change their minds.  Similarly, there are 
valid substantive concerns about a runaway majority moving bills through 
late in a Congress without giving the minority or the public a chance to re-
spond.  The fact that extraordinary time pressure makes it easier to filibuster 
does not diminish the argument that there is a stronger justification for ob-
struction under those circumstances.  Finally, the Senate can still use a 
mechanism to register preference intensity as cloture debates did before the 
two-track system took over.61  
Giving forty-one senators the power to delay nominations or bills for 
only a limited period of time would address many of these issues by return-
                                                                                                                           
cable upon a particular measure after unlimited debate for a specified minimum number of days.  Such 
an alteration would not end obstruction.  It would, however, make action by the Senate less difficult and 
more responsive to the will of a majority.”). 
59  A Parliament lasts for a maximum of five years unless both chambers vote to extend its term, 
which has not happened since World War II.  See Parliament Act, 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 13, § 7 (U.K.) 
(reducing the length of a Parliament from seven years to five); id. § 2 (noting that a bill to extend a term 
of Parliament is exempt from the terms of the Act and thus requires the Lords’ assent). 
60  To avoid confusion, there is no equivalent to the filibuster in the House of Lords.  The compari-
son this Essay makes is at a higher level of generality between the Lords and the House of Commons, 
whereas in the Senate the relevant fight is between a majoritarian rule and a supermajority cloture rule. 
61  Admittedly, one could say that senators have better ways of learning about voter preferences 
(such as polls), but a cost-effective method of revealing that information in the chamber would still be 
helpful.  In this respect, I think it would not be a good idea to reform cloture by forcing opponents to 
produce forty-one votes in order to continue debate whenever the majority makes such a demand (e.g., 
at 3 AM on Christmas Eve).  That would make it too difficult to mount a filibuster and be tantamount to 
majority cloture. 
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ing cloture to its procedural roots.62  First, a minority that knows it cannot 
block a pending matter without convincing the majority to reverse course 
would have a strong incentive to take the floor and make its case.  This 
would enhance the quality of debate in the Senate on many issues and make 
the dissidents accountable in a way that they are not under current filibuster 
practice, where they do not need to say anything.63  Second, giving the mi-
nority the right to impose a “cooling-off” period would keep the majority 
from acting recklessly and would let voters express their views in an elec-
tion before a bill introduced at the end of a Congress could be enacted.64  
Third, suspensory cloture would give the Senate a way to sort its internal 
preferences.  If the majority failed to bring up a measure until a few months 
before the election, then that would show that its preference is rather weak 
because a filibuster could kill the proposal until the next Congress.65  At the 
same time, the minority would be making a significant statement if it fought 
to the bitter end on a timely matter despite knowing that the effort would be 
futile.66  
One problem with having a time limit on a refusal to vote for cloture is 
that the limit must recognize that the Senate needs to pass legislation within 
a given Congress.  Suppose that a bill comes to the floor with just six 
 
62  An alternative suggestion involves adopting a sliding scale that would let a majority end debate 
after a certain period of time but give, for example, fifty-five senators the power to impose cloture 
sooner.  See BINDER & SMITH, supra note 3, at 211 (describing this proposal).  This is a fine idea too, 
but this Essay focuses on why setting a time limit is the right approach and not on how much time there 
should be.   
The clock on any temporary veto should begin to run when a matter goes through the regular proce-
dures and reaches the floor (whether by committee vote or by an amendment to pending legislation).  A 
conference report reconciling the views of both houses should not be considered a separate bill subject 
to an independent delay, but if it is, then the duration of the veto should be reduced accordingly.  On the 
other hand, at some point a substantive amendment to a pending bill should be deemed as restarting the 
clock, otherwise the majority could simply run out the one-year limit with “dummy” bills and then 
amend that legislation as if by majority cloture.  One way to deal with this problem might be to say that 
any nongermane amendment restarts the cloture clock. 
63  The minority could still force the majority to withdraw a measure by bringing all Senate business 
to a halt until its demand was met, but that is unlikely to occur.  Such a threat would have to be carried 
out for a long time to be credible, and only a very intense opposition could manage that.  In effect, turn-
ing cloture into a suspensory veto switches the burden of proof on this question from the majority to the 
minority.  Holding the Senate hostage will also probably be a less effective strategy than using morning 
business (i.e., the time set aside for senators to discuss anything) to challenge a proposal in the hope that 
reason and a change in the political climate might cause the majority to reconsider. 
64  For an example of a hasty legislature, see Gerard N. Magliocca, Huey P. Long and the Guarantee 
Clause, 83 TUL. L. REV. 1, 13–14 (2008) (explaining that the Louisiana Legislature in the mid-1930s 
allowed a majority to suspend the rules and often passed legislation after only a few minutes of debate). 
65  This would not always be true, as there are some bills that are brought forward late in a Congress 
because of a sudden crisis.  Of course, there is also a strong argument that those kinds of measures 
should be given more careful consideration or should be discussed in an election campaign. 
66  The evidence from the House of Lords after the creation of a suspensory veto in 1911 suggests 
that the power would not be used routinely.  See JENKINS, supra note ‡, at 272–77 (noting that from 
1911 to 1947 the Lords only rejected three bills passed by the House of Commons). 
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months remaining in a Congress and is filibustered.  Such a bill could not 
become law unless the Senate passed it again the next year, which would 
permit another round of delay depending on the result of the intervening 
election.  In other words, a suspensory veto could be twice as long as the 
proposed rule contemplates.  Perhaps this is the best approach, but the Sen-
ate could amend Rule XXII to say that a majority can impose cloture on 
bills passed during successive sessions only when that would not shorten 
the original veto.67 
The issues broached by the prior hypothetical raise the basic question 
of how long the delay should be when a minority resists a vote on final pas-
sage.  There is nothing magical about using one year as the limit.  I am sim-
ply borrowing that figure from the procedure used in the House of Lords 
and the House of Commons, which is discussed in the next section.  Since 
the Senate often stands in recess for a month, the cloture rule could not be 
that short.68  Likewise, a veto longer than a year would require a majority to 
move something to the floor during the first half of a Congress to avoid a 
filibuster, which would be a considerable burden.  In the final analysis, 
there is room for experimentation on this question.  The 1911 Parliament 
Act, which overhauled the suspensory veto of the Lords, set that period of 
delay at two years for most bills.69  It was not until 1949 that this limit was 
lowered to one.70  Let us turn to how Parliament reached this equilibrium, as 
a way of putting my proposal into a broader context. 
B. Drawing on the British Parliamentary Experience 
The fight between the House of Commons and the House of Lords 
over the role that the latter should play in Parliament echoes many themes 
in the cloture debate.  In both cases, the argument for maintaining a strong 
countermajoritarian force in a legislature was largely procedural, but over 
time this idea was undermined by its transformation into a mostly substan-
 
67  In other words, the Senate should not be able to pass a bill in December of one Congress and re-
enact it in January of the following one if a minority objects.  The Parliament Act of 1949 provides that 
most bills passed in successive sessions by the House of Commons (without the assent of the Lords) be-
come law even if that happens in different parliaments.  See Parliament Act, 1949, 12, 13 & 14 Geo. 6, 
c. 103, § 1 (U.K.).  A nomination could be handled along similar lines, but the President would have to 
nominate the candidate again before the Senate could put that person on the executive calendar.  
68  Otherwise, that would be tantamount to majority cloture if the matter were scheduled strategi-
cally.  Of course, the time limit could be calculated in terms of hours of debate or days in session, but 
that would be more complex. 
69  See Parliament Act, 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 13, § 2(1) (U.K.).  Technically, the suspensory veto 
was two years and one month, as the Lords were given a month to act when the bill was passed by the 
House of Commons.  See JENKINS, supra note ‡, at 130 (describing the substance of what became the 
Act).   
70  See JENKINS, supra note ‡, at 273–74 (stating that the proposal to reduce the suspensory veto was 
made, in part, to expedite the nationalization of the steel industry after World War II). 
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tive rule.  The end result was that the Lords’ veto was downgraded from ab-
solute to suspensory, which is exactly what should happen in the Senate. 
Prior to 1832, the unelected House of Lords was the dominant house of 
Parliament.71  In large part, its dominance stemmed from the fact that indi-
vidual Lords often controlled who was elected to the Commons within their 
fiefdoms.72  Furthermore, virtually all bills required the Lords’ assent to be-
come law.73  All of this changed with the enactment of the Reform Act of 
1832, which expanded suffrage and reapportioned the boroughs represented 
in the Commons.74  Not surprisingly, the Lords fought against this bill and 
agreed only when the Crown threatened to swamp the chamber with new 
peers who would vote for reform.75 
In the wake of this catastrophic defeat, the Lords needed a theory to 
justify why it made sense to vest an unelected body with the power to block 
legislation passed by elected representatives, and their answer was that re-
taining a check-and-balance would produce more thorough deliberation.76  
Instead of letting the majority of the Commons legislate unilaterally, the 
 
71  Traditionally, the peers that made up the House of Lords were temporal (hereditary aristocrats), 
spiritual (the Anglican bishops), and, at a much later point, legal (the Law Lords).  In 2009, the judicial 
function of the chamber came to an end with the creation of a British Supreme Court.  See Constitutional 
Reform Act, 2005, c. 4, §§ 23–60 (U.K.).   
The Lords use some quirky procedures.  For example, instead of voting “yes” or “no,” they vote 
“content” or “not content.”  See JENKINS, supra note ‡, at 265 (describing the vote on the Parliament Act 
of 1911).  The chamber can also cut off a member’s speech in progress by approving a motion that “the 
noble Lord be no longer heard,” which is definitely different from the Senate.   
72  See BAGEHOT, supra note 12, at xxv (stating that before 1832 “[b]y their commanding influence 
in many boroughs and counties the Lords nominated a considerable part of the Commons”); Rivka 
Weill, Evolution vs. Revolution: Dueling Models of Dualism, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 429, 439 (2006) (“The 
House of Lords indirectly controlled the House of Commons, primarily by determining its composi-
tion.”). 
73  The only exception involved revenue bills, as custom held that the Lords should defer to the 
House of Commons.  See 1 WILLIAM MANCHESTER, THE LAST LION: WINSTON SPENCER CHURCHILL 
407 (1983) (“[S]ince 1660 money matters, by custom, had been left to the commoners.”).  The special 
convention for budget matters (before and after 1911) mirrors the reconciliation procedure in the Senate 
for the budget, under which Rule XXII does not apply.  See supra note 3. 
74  See Reform Act of 1832, 2 & 3 Will. 4, c. 45 §§ I–XVII (Eng.); Reform Act of 1832, 2 & 3 Will. 
4, c. 65 §§ I, IV (Scot.); Reform Act of 1832, 2 & 3 Will. 4, c. 88 (Ir.); BAGEHOT, supra note 12, at xxv 
(“By the Act of 1832 this was much altered.  The aristocracy and the gentry lost their predominance in 
the House of Commons; that predominance passed to the middle class.  The two Houses then became 
distinct, but then they ceased to be co-equal.”). 
75  See Weill, supra note 72, at 455 (quoting the Prime Minister during the debate on the Reform 
Act, who explained that without the threat of Lords-packing “this country is placed entirely under the 
influence of an uncontrollable oligarchy”). 
76  See BAGEHOT, supra note 12, at 100 (“Since the Reform Act the House of Lords has become a 
revising and suspending House.  It can alter Bills; it can reject Bills on which the House of Commons is 
not yet thoroughly in earnest—upon which the nation is not yet determined.”); cf. JENKINS, supra note ‡, 
at 94 (quoting a speech by Prime Minister Lloyd George in 1909 in which he asked why “500 men, or-
dinary men chosen accidentally from among the unemployed, override the judgment—the deliberate 
judgment—of millions of people who are engaged in the industry which makes the wealth of the coun-
try” (quoting Mr. Lloyd George at Newcastle, TIMES (London), Oct. 11, 1909, at 6)). 
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Lords would amend bills, slow the process down, and provide breathing 
space for reflection.77  They could also reject bills and require the Commons 
to pass them again to test the elected majority’s resolve.  And on matters of 
grave concern, a steadfast rejection would force a general election that gave 
voters a chance to decide if a proposal by the Commons deserved support.78  
A norm evolved that if the Commons approved the controversial bill again 
after the election, then the Lords would cease their resistance.79  In effect, 
the House of Lords enforced a “second-look” doctrine that was intended to 
assess preference intensity but conceded the power of the majority to rule in 
the end.80   
At the end of the nineteenth century, however, this procedure came un-
der attack because the veto of the House of Lords was seen more and more 
as a substantive impediment.  The problem was that there were far more To-
ries than Liberals in the Lords.  As one observer explained: 
When the Conservative Party is in power, . . . there is practically no House of 
Lords: it takes whatever the Conservative Government brings it from the 
House of Commons without question or dispute; but the moment a Liberal 
Government is formed, this harmless body assumes an active life, and its activ-
ity is entirely exercised in opposition to the Government.81 
The British public could accept an aristocratic veto on behalf of delib-
erative democracy or fundamental rights, but that power became illegiti-
 
77  See BAGEHOT, supra note 12, at 115 (“[T]he constitution of the House of Lords only guards 
against a single error—that of too quick change.”); cf. JENKINS, supra note ‡, at 200 (stating that the To-
ries were opposed to “Single-Chamber tyranny”).  
78  See Weill, supra note 72, at 444 (quoting Lord Salisbury’s view that “[i]t may be that the House 
of Commons in determining the opinion of the nation is wrong, and if there are grounds for entertaining 
that belief, it is always open to [the House of Lords], and indeed it is the duty of this House, to insist that 
the nation shall be consulted”).  For example, in 1869 the Lords rejected a bill to disestablish the Irish 
Church and only reversed course after a general election returned the Government to power.  See id. at 
441. 
79  See BAGEHOT, supra note 12, at xxvii (“[T]he House of Lords must yield whenever the opinion 
of the Commons is also the opinion of the nation, and when it is clear that the nation has made up its 
mind.”); see also ALBERT VENN DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 375 (2010) (1902) (“[T]he point at which the Lords must yield or the Crown intervene is 
properly determined by anything which conclusively shows that the House of Commons represents on 
the matter in dispute the deliberate decision of the nation.”).  
80  See BAGEHOT, supra note 12, at 100 (“Their veto is a sort of hypothetical veto.  They say, We re-
ject your Bill for this once, or these twice, or even these thrice: but if you keep on sending it up, at last 
we won’t reject it.”).  For a thoughtful discussion of second-look doctrines, see Guido Calabresi, Anti-
discrimination and Constitutional Accountability (What the Bork–Brennan Debate Ignores), 105 HARV. 
L. REV. 80, 104–08 (1991).  While the House of Lords was not an elected body, the chamber did use a 
majority voting rule for its own actions. 
81  JENKINS, supra note ‡, at 34 (quoting Memorandum from Lord Rosebery to the Queen (Apr. 7, 
1984), reprinted in MARQUESS OF CREWE, 2 LORD ROSEBERY 451–54 (1931))); see id. at 24 (noting 
that in 1906 only 88 of the 602 peers were self-identified Liberals, while 355 called themselves Tories). 
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mate once it was used as a partisan tool.82  This feeling was captured by 
Prime Minister David Lloyd George’s insult that the Lords were a tool of 
the Opposition Leader in the Commons, Arthur Balfour, and not a constitu-
tional guardian.83  The last straw came from 1906 to 1911, when Liberal 
majorities (returned by three separate general elections) could not get their 
program through the Lords.84  Consequently, the Commons passed the Par-
liament Act of 1911, backed by another threat of Lords-packing from the 
Crown, providing that most bills passed by three consecutive sessions of the 
Commons would become law without the approval of the Lords.85 
There are several parallels between this reform of Parliament and the 
evolution of Rule XXII in the Senate.  First, both cases offered a procedural 
reason for originally denying the elected majority the right to act.86  A pro-
cedural argument was persuasive because many institutions in a legislature, 
such as the requirement that a committee approve a bill, are not strictly ma-
joritarian and yet are useful for fostering debate.  Second, the Senate and 
the House of Lords both established a custom that allowed a determined 
majority to work its will.87  Third, that norm collapsed as the minority veto 
 
82  See id. at 44 (quoting Prime Minister Henry Campbell-Bannerman’s speech to the Commons in 
1906, in which he said: “It is plainly intolerable, Sir, . . . that a Second Chamber should, while one party 
in the State is in power, be its willing servant, and when that party has received an unmistakable and 
emphatic condemnation by the country, the House of Lords should then be able to neutralize, thwart, 
and distort the policy which the electors have approved”).  There is a parallel here with those who prefer 
to defend judicial review on the ground that it is “representation-reinforcing” and not substantive.  See 
e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980). 
83  See supra epigraph accompanying note ‡; see also MANCHESTER, supra note 73, at 410–11 (quot-
ing Churchill’s view that the Lords was “a miserable minority of titled persons who represent nobody, 
who are responsible to nobody and who only scurry up to London to vote in their party interests, their 
class interests and in their own interests”). 
84  See Weill, supra note 72, at 442 (“Two consecutive elections during the same year, 1910, were 
needed to demonstrate clear popular endorsement of the Parliament bill.”); see also JENKINS, supra note 
‡, at 19 (describing the Liberal win of 1906); id. at 107–20 (discussing the first general election of 
1910); id. at 185–93 (describing the second election campaign of 1910); MANCHESTER, supra note 73, at 
407 (explaining that in this period the Lords rejected the Liberal education bill, voting bill, land reform 
bill, and temperance bill).  
85  See Parliament Act, 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 13, § 2(1) (U.K.); JENKINS, supra note ‡, at 219 (quot-
ing Prime Minister H.H. Asquith’s letter stating that “should the necessity arise, the Government will 
advise the King to exercise his Prerogative to secure the passing into Law of the [Parliament Act of 
1911] in substantially the same form in which it left the House of Commons, and His Majesty has been 
pleased to signify that he will consider it his duty to accept and act on that advice”).  
86  Of course, prior to 1832, the legitimacy of the Lords was based on the substantive ground that 
aristocrats were superior to regular people, but that rationale need not concern us here.  And I am not 
suggesting that the current cloture rule is as hostile to majority rule as having a powerful unelected sec-
ond chamber of Parliament.  The point is simply that some relevant comparisons can be made between 
the two examples. 
87  Moreover, in both cases that norm was (imperfectly) sustained by the credible threat of a rule 
change to end obstruction.  In the Senate, that could be done through a ruling of the presiding officer, 
and in the House of Lords the lever was Lords-packing.  The problem in both cases was that the majority 
needed the cooperation of a third-party wild card (the Vice President in the Senate or the Crown in Par-
liament). 
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was increasingly seen as substantive and illegitimate.88  In Britain, the solu-
tion to an obstructionist minority was a suspensory veto.89 
The current practice under Rule XXII is analogous to the discredited 
power that the Lords held prior to 1911, but in some respects it is worse.  
One could say, for example, that a consistent refusal to vote for cloture in 
the Senate lets voters decide whether or not a particular bill should pass, 
which is how the Lords explained its obstructionism.90  Of course, since 
only one-third of the Senate is up for election in any particular cycle, that 
appeal to the vox populi is muffled compared to what occurs in the House 
of Commons, where all members stand for election every time.  Put another 
way, there is no custom holding that if the party backing a filibustered bill 
retains its Senate majority after an election, then the minority will relent.   
In sum, adopting the settlement that Parliament reached—a temporary 
veto for the House of Lords designed to further discussion while restricting 
minority obstruction—would also be the best reform for cloture.  The ques-
tion is, how can reformers convince the Senate to change Rule XXII? 
III. MAKING THE SENATE SEE THE LIGHT  
This Part explores how the Senate could be encouraged to support fili-
buster reform.  A campaign spearheaded by sympathetic senators and as-
sisted by the President is necessary but might not be sufficient.91  The 
Senate is understandably proud of its culture and is unlikely to change un-
less other elected institutions act to supplement a popular outcry.  Fortu-
nately, there are some precedents of external forces causing the Senate to 
abolish privileges held by its minority.  
 
88  One distinction is that the House of Lords was considered flagrantly partisan by the time the 1911 
Parliament Act was passed, whereas the Senate filibuster is not exclusively the domain of one party.  
Nevertheless, the change from a restrained procedural instrument into an aggressive substantive one was 
the same for both chambers. 
89  In addition to the advantages of a temporary veto mentioned above, the House of Lords can still 
amend bills to slow the process down and spark more debate.  It can also reject a bill and test the will of 
the Government by making it pass the bill again.  And the Government’s decision to bring a measure 
forward in the final year of a Parliament means that there is a risk that the bill will not become law, as a 
defeat at the polls might bring a new party into power.  What the Lords cannot do is stop an elected ma-
jority in the Commons from getting its way when the matter is a high priority.  
90  See supra text accompanying notes 76–80. 
91  A campaign against the filibuster mounted by President Wilson led to the adoption of the original 
cloture rule.  See BURDETTE, supra note 18, at 121 (“The Senate of the United States is the only legisla-
tive body in the world . . . which cannot act when its majority is ready for action. . . .  The remedy?  
There is but one remedy.  The only remedy is that the rules of the Senate shall be so altered that it can 
act.” (quoting Text of the President’s Statement to the Public, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 1917, at 1)); Gold & 
Gupta, supra note 7, at 219 (describing the sharp public reaction against the filibuster of the Armed Ship 
Bill in 1917).  Given that this rule did little to change Senate practice, though, the success of that cam-
paign is open to question. 
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A. Native Americans, Elections, and Treaties 
There are at least three significant cases when the Senate was forced to 
eliminate some internal minority rights92: (1) the conduct of Native Ameri-
can policy in the nineteenth century, (2) the ratification of the Seventeenth 
Amendment in the 1910s, and (3) the development of the congressional-
executive agreement during World War II.  Each of these examples is ad-
dressed in turn.   
1. Ending the Use of Tribal Treaties.—Prior to the Civil War, the 
federal government dealt with the Native American tribes via treaties nego-
tiated by the President and ratified by two-thirds of the Senate.93  The House 
of Representatives became frustrated with its exclusion from tribal policy 
by the 1860s, in part due to institutional pride and also because the treaty 
system led to massive corruption.94  As one representative explained, “if 
there is any one thing known to the country and to this House it is that the 
whole Indian department, in its management, has become utterly rotten, ut-
terly corrupt,” and thus something should be done to stop “the plunder and 
robbery that is going on under the cover of the treaty-making power.”95  
One Senator responded that the House possessed “no legitimate power 
whatever over the subject of Indian treaties any more than it has over trea-
ties with foreign Governments” and that the Senate should not give in to 
demands that this authority be shared.96  
After several years of wrangling on this issue, the House took the dras-
tic action of refusing to appropriate any money to implement new tribal 
treaties.97  Without funding, and with no power to force the House to pro-
 
92  None of these precedents involved internal rule changes, although on the question of treaties one 
could say that the Senate’s interpretation of its own rules was transformed. 
93  See Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194, 202 (1975) (“For nearly a century the Executive 
Branch made treaty arrangements with the Indians ‘by and with the Advice and Consent of the Sen-
ate[.]’  Although the House appropriated money to carry out these treaties, it had no voice in the devel-
opment of substantive Indian policy reflected in them.” (citation omitted)); GERARD N. MAGLIOCCA, 
ANDREW JACKSON AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE RISE AND FALL OF GENERATIONAL REGIMES 69 
(2007) (describing the Senate’s debate on the Treaty of New Echota, which legitimized President Jack-
son’s plan to remove the Cherokee Nation along the “Trail of Tears”). 
94  See ROBERT WINSTON MARDOCK, THE REFORMERS AND THE AMERICAN INDIAN 74 (1971) (stat-
ing that in 1870 “the House brought attention to four Indian treaties, then in the Senate, that had granted 
large areas of Kansas and Nebraska Indian reservations to railroad companies at ridiculously low 
prices”); see also 1 FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER: THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT 
AND THE AMERICAN INDIANS 530 (1984) (“The most celebrated case was a treaty signed with the Os-
ages in 1868 by which eight million acres of land was to be sold to railroad interests at about twenty 
cents an acre.”). 
95  CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 1st Sess. 166 (1869) (statement of Rep. Lawrence). 
96  CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 2517 (1870) (statement of Sen. Davis). 
97  See CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 1st Sess. 166 (1869) (statement of Rep. Axtell) (“I would stop at 
once the appropriations of money to carry out these pretended treaties.”); see also Antoine, 420 U.S. at 
202 (“After further unsuccessful House attempts to enter the field of federal Indian policy, the House 
refused to grant funds to carry out new treaties.”); cf. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 1st Sess. 167 (1869) 
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vide any, the Senate capitulated in 1871 and passed a statute stating that “no 
Indian nation or tribe within the territory of the United States shall be ac-
knowledged or recognized as an independent nation, tribe, or power with 
whom the United States may contract by treaty.”98  Thus, the spending 
strike by the House diminished the Senate’s authority as a whole and the 
power of one-third of the Senate to influence Native American policy by 
blocking a proposed treaty.  
2. The Seventeenth Amendment.—The Constitution had provided that 
senators would be chosen by state legislatures, but by the late nineteenth 
century, Populists and Progressives were clamoring for direct Senate elec-
tions.99  Starting in 1894, the House of Representatives responded by re-
peatedly passing a constitutional amendment to this effect, but the Senate 
declined to even bring the proposal to the floor.100  Supporters of reform 
pushed through changes in state election law (such as party primaries and 
the use of nonbinding ballot initiatives that let voters express their general 
election preferences on Senate candidates) that increased the influence of 
voters over the selection process.101  But these revisions in state law alone 
were not going to convince two-thirds of the Senate to change its attitude. 
Confronted by this obstacle, proponents of direct election of senators 
tried to get state legislatures to summon a constitutional convention to sub-
mit the proposal directly to the states.102  Thirty-one legislatures, one short 
of the two-thirds needed to convene an Article V convention at the time, 
                                                                                                                           
(statement of Rep. Julian) (“I want to remind the gentleman that this House has repeatedly declared that 
this Indian treaty policy is unwarranted by the Constitution, and if he will lecture the Senate, which has 
utterly disregarded our action on this subject, he will talk to the body that needs enlightenment.”). 
98  Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 120, 16 Stat. 544, 566 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 71 (2006)); see Antoine, 
420 U.S. at 202 (“Finally, the Senate capitulated and joined the House in passage of the 1871 Act as a 
rider to the Indian Appropriation Act of 1871.”). 
99  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1 (“The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two 
Senators from each State, chosen by the Legislature thereof . . . .”), amended by U.S. CONST. amend. 
XVII; DAVID E. KYVIG, EXPLICIT AND AUTHENTIC ACTS: AMENDING THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, 1776–
1995, at 208–09 (1996). 
100  See Walter Clark, The Next Constitutional Convention of the United States, 16 YALE L.J. 65, 72 
(1906) (“Five times has a bill, proposing such amendment to the Constitution, passed the House of Rep-
resentatives by a practically unanimous vote, and each time it has been lost in the Senate; but never by a 
direct vote.  It has always been disposed of by the chloroform process of referring the bill to a commit-
tee, which never reports it back, and never will.”). 
101  See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 411–12 (2005) (discussing 
these efforts). 
102  See U.S. CONST. art. V (stating that Congress, “on the Application of the Legislatures of two 
thirds of the several States, shall call a convention for proposing Amendments”); see also RALPH A. 
ROSSUM, FEDERALISM, THE SUPREME COURT, AND THE SEVENTEENTH AMENDMENT: THE IRONY OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 193 (2001) (“In 1900, the Pennsylvania legislature took the decisive 
step of suggesting to the states a coordinated effort to demand a convention; believing that the Senate 
would not act until two-thirds of the states forced it to do so, it sent to all the states a copy of its conven-
tion petition and encouraged them to submit one as well.”).  
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embraced the proposal.103  Faced with pressure from the very legislatures 
that elected them, the Senators fell into line and passed the amendment in 
1912.104  Unlike the debate on tribal treaties, there is no evidence that state 
legislative action against the Senate caused its sudden about-face, but the 
timing of the change suggests that state legislative action had an effect. 
3. Congressional-Executive Agreements in the 1940s.—Returning to 
the issue of treaty ratification during World War II, the House of Represen-
tatives and the President expressed growing frustration with the power of a 
Senate minority to block international treaties.105  There was concern that 
any attempt to build a stable world order would founder just as it had when 
a Senate minority rejected the Treaty of Versailles after World War I.106  In 
an echo of the battle over Native American regulation, the House began 
clamoring for the right to treat international treaties as congressional-
executive agreements that needed only a majority vote of each House.  Sen-
ate leaders such as Robert Taft rejected the idea that “anything that can be 
done by treaty can be done by executive agreement,” adding that “[t]he 
founding fathers felt that the matter of assuming obligations or making 
promises to do something in the future for foreign nations was of sufficient 
importance to require that the proposal have the support of two-thirds of the 
Senators elected to the Senate.”107  As one scholar opined: “When two thirds 
of the Senate consent to relax any of that body’s powers something like the 
millennium will have dawned.”108 
 
103  See C.H. HOEBEKE, THE ROAD TO MASS DEMOCRACY: ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE 
SEVENTEENTH AMENDMENT 149 (1995) (“[T]he majority of states were willing to risk opening Pan-
dora’s Box for the sake of securing the popular election of senators.”); see also RUSSELL L. CAPLAN, 
CONSTITUTIONAL BRINKSMANSHIP: AMENDING THE CONSTITUTION BY NATIONAL CONVENTION 63–64 
(1988) (discussing the state legislative activity).  Though state legislatures were, in effect, giving up 
their own power over the Senate by joining the reform effort, there were valid reasons for this choice.  
See AMAR, supra note 101, at 412 (noting that deadlocks in state legislatures over the Senate choice fre-
quently kept them from taking up important state business). 
104  See ROSSUM, supra note 102, at 194 (“The fear of a ‘runaway’ constitutional convention, along 
with the fact that most senators represented states whose legislatures were on record as favoring direct 
election of the Senate, proved decisive.”); cf. CAPLAN, supra note 103, at 62 (noting that by this time 
both the national Democratic Party and President Taft supported the change). 
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Undaunted by this intransigence, President Roosevelt and his allies in 
the House settled on a two-pronged strategy to abolish the Senate’s treaty 
monopoly.  First, the Administration sent up several popular international 
agreements for ratification by a majority of each House of Congress and 
dared the Senate to defeat them as inconsistent with the Treaty Clause.109  
Second, the House passed a constitutional amendment in 1945 that abol-
ished the Treaty Clause entirely and provided that a majority of each House 
was needed for ratification.110  While the Senate valiantly maintained that it 
was not relinquishing its constitutional prerogative as it passed a number of 
binding foreign agreements that the House also voted on, senators eventu-
ally stopped challenging the President’s power to ignore the traditional 
treaty ratification process.111  While this means of bringing majority rule to 
the Senate for international treaties did not involve funding restrictions as 
was the case for tribal treaties, the legal form that emerged in both cases 
was identical. 
B. Unconventional Action and the Filibuster 
Some of the methods used in these prior standoffs with the Senate 
could be revived to obtain cloture reform, though garnering support for 
such dramatic actions would be difficult.  For example, the House of Repre-
sentatives could pass a constitutional amendment on cloture, or state legis-
latures could seek an Article V convention that would accomplish the same 
objective.  But these tools are blunt and impractical.  A more sophisticated 
approach inspired by these earlier confrontations would work better.  
 One way to pressure the Senate would be for the President and the 
House to propose new framework statutes, not unlike the budget reconcilia-
tion process, that would place strict restrictions on debate about laws on 
certain subjects.112  The Senate would probably resist these initiatives, but 
forcing senators to take that position visibly and often might lead them to 
rethink their stance on cloture, as it did for congressional-executive agree-
ments.  If the Senate accepted more of these framework laws, it would un-
dercut current cloture practice and give the House and the President an 
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opening to impose a suspensory veto on the Senate through similar legisla-
tion.  
The House could also deny earmarks to senators who support Rule 
XXII, which mimics how the power of the purse was used to end tribal trea-
ties.  There is no way, of course, for the House to discipline the entire Sen-
ate by withholding money.  Nevertheless, pressuring individual senators is 
possible (though it would require a single-minded focus that may be tough 
to achieve given the House’s other priorities).  The Senate could theoreti-
cally retaliate by rejecting House earmarks, but that threat would not be an 
effective deterrent.  The House would only have to single out senators who 
supported Rule XXII, and those senators would likely have a hard time 
convincing others to fight back.  
In sum, history informs us that the Senate can be coerced into abandon-
ing its supermajority rules through public pressure and a coordinated insti-
tutional response.  In the cloture context, all of the weapons used in the 
past—a selective-spending boycott by the House of Representatives, state 
petitions for a constitutional convention under Article V, a proposed consti-
tutional amendment, and bills seeking to supersede Rule XXII by restruc-
turing debate on specific issues—may be necessary to prevail. 
CONCLUSION 
Maintaining the integrity of a tradition often requires change.  The cus-
tom of extended debate in the Senate was consistent with the principle of 
majority rule for almost two centuries.  But alterations in the size, work, 
and rules of the Senate have rendered that practice untenable without sub-
stantial reform.  The best solution lies with an adaptation of the suspensory 
veto wielded by the House of Lords.  Giving forty-one senators the right to 
delay action for a limited period of time will restore the majority’s substan-
tive power while reviving the deliberative benefits long associated with the 
filibuster.  Though the Senate will probably not rush to embrace a revision 
of its rules, a mix of persuasion and pressure can help to catalyze the 
change that is necessary to restore the legitimacy of this critical procedural 
device.  I could go on forever about the wisdom of my proposal, but I will 
now yield the floor.  
 
 
